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ABSTRACT
Risk Analysis of Earth Dams
by
Jon Clair Howell, Master of Science
Utah State University, 1980

Major Professor: Dr. Loren R. Anderson
Department: Geotechnical Engineering

The purpose of this thesis is to present in a logical and
straightforward manner, the types of probabilistic, deterministic and
judgment methods which should be part of a risk analysis process for
earth dam planning, design, construction and operation.

In doing

this, an attempt was made to include all of the elements (components
of the risk analysis procedure defined herein) which were considered
to be important.

Descriptions of these elements as well as how they

are used to estimate probabilities for the occurrence of each of three
failure conditions (i.e. no failure, partial failure, complete failure) are also presented.

Explanations are given as to how these

failure probabilities can be used in estimating the consequences
resulting from the failure of an earth dam.
failure

probabilit~es

The potential use of the

in conjunction with estimated consequences in

decision making related to all phases of a dam project as well as land
use planning near the dam are discussed.

The possibility of performing

a case study using the data base of Soldier Creek Dam, a project of
the Water and Power Resources Service, is also presented.
(93 pages)

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In most conventional structural analyses, the safety of the
project is usually measured by means of a factor of safety against a
particular failure mode.

The question can be raised, however, as to

the confidence which can be placed on such a factor.

A-Grivas (1980)

indicates that much literature dealing with the safety factors
of soil structures suggests that failures have occurred with safety
factors being greater than one, while others have shown considerable
success even though the safety factor was less than one.

Another

limitation of the safety factor approach is that two designs which
have identical safety factors would have very different probabilities
of failure if the variablity in the soil properties was significantly
different, but this is not accounted for by the conventional analysis.
As a result of recent earth dam failures, particularly Teton Dam
on June 5, 1976, there has been an increasing awareness of the lack of
a comprehensive risk analysis procedure for earth dams.

Risk analysis

methods have not been used by engineers for the design of major earth
dams.

This is true largely because the general public does not like

to think that there is any probability no matter how small, that a
large structure such as an earth dam could fail.

Also, many

en~ineers

question the accuracy of probabilities with computed values of 10-7
or less, especially when they are based on methods using
past experience.

jud~ent

or

Finally, earth dams are unique in terms of founda-

tion conditions, quantity and quality of available material,
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hydrologic conditions, downstream exposure, and many other factors.
Therefore, it is difficult to develop a rigorous, clear cut design
method for a structure that has so many unique characteristics and 1S
so variable with respect to quality control considerations.
Risk assessment is a method which could be used 1n an attempt to
determine the safety of an engineering project based on probability
theory and reliability analysis.

The idea of using risk assessment in

civil engineering is relatively new but it is becoming more popular in
the hope that it might be a means of overcoming the shortcomings
associated with the conventional analysis.

Several approaches

to risk analysis in engineering projects have been proposed in recent
years.

Bowles, Anderson, and Canfield (1978) proposed a phased risk

analysis procedure which utilizes a growing data base to determine the
reliability of an engineering project at any time during its life.
General risk assessment approaches have been discussed by Rowe (1977)
where he emphasized the importance of technical and social value
judgments relative to purely empirical scientific consideration in the
assessment of risk.

Methods have been proposed for earth dam classi-

fication by government organizations such as the Soil Conservation
Service in an effort to evaluate the risk potential in earth dam
projects.

A handicap to the implementation of risk analysis pro-

cedures for earth dams is the lack of sound procedures for estimating
the probabilities of various types of structural performance.

One

idea in which considerable progress has been made is probabilistic
approaches to slope stability analysis which have been proposed by Wu
and Kraft (1970), Matsuo and Kuroda (1974), Alonso (1976), Harr
(1977), Vanmarcke(1977, 1979), Sharp et al. (1980) and others.
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Purpose
As indicated above, there is a need for more research and
development with respect to risk analysis of earth dams.

Since risk

analysis is still in its infancy, a foundation is required on which to
build further developments of the method in the future.

As well as

a platform for further development, this study is an effort to familiarize the engineer with the general procedure of a comprehensive risk
analysis for earth dams.

In doing this, probabilistic modeling,

empirical, and judgment procedures will be proposed to estimate the
probabilities of various failure modes, with their corresponding
outcomes and the ultimate consequences resulting from these failure
modes.

A discussion of the potential use of the probability and

damage estimates in decision making related to earth dam planning,
design, construction and operation will also be presented.
Objectives
The specific objectives of this study are summarized below:
A.

The establishment of an organized sequential procedure to

estimate the probability of failure of an earth dam while taking as
many variables into account as are considered to be important.
1.

Identification of various event-system response-outcomeexposure-consequence pathways linking events such as a flood
or an earthquake to consequences such as property damage

2.

Identification of existing or proposed procedures based on
empirical, analytical, or engineering judgment approaches for
estimating the probabilities of occurrence of:

4

a.

each event

b.

each system response given that an event takes place

c.

each outcome given that a system response takes place

d.

each consequence as a function of various exposure factors
given that an outcome takes place

3.

The evaluation of the statistical independence of the various
probabilities identified in secondary objective 2 along with
a proposed procedure for handling nonindependent probabilities

4.

Identification of procedures and data needs for estimating
the consequences (e.g. dollar damages) of various exposure
factors (e.g. time of year, dam location, flood warning
time)

5.

Discussion of the potential use of the probability and damage
estimates in decision making related to earth dam planning,
design, construction, and operation (e.g. site selection,
selection of design parameters, materials selection, quality
control, and operating rules)

B.

The establishment of a specific framework of a detailed risk

analysis case study of Soldier Creek Dam which should also be applicable to similar structures.

This will provide a basis for further

development and refinement of this risk analysis method in the future.
With the limited research development funds, extensive analytical work
will not be performed on Soldier Creek Dam during this initial phase.
The identification of the expanding data and information base for
Soldier Creek Dam from conceptualization through construction and into
operation will be made.

5

Significance
An advantage of the risk analysis procedure described herein is
that the analysis can be tailored to the project's "growing data
base."

This refers to the data which is available from the init ial

project planning through operation and maintenance.

As the data base

grows through more and more investigations, calculations, and tests,
the confidence which can be placed on the estimated probability of
failure increases.

This thesis will outline a probabilistic method

which is combined with several empirical and judgment procedures
for estimating the probability of failure of an earth dam at any
stage in its life.

This analysis will utilize state of the art

deterministic slope stability methods such as Bishop's method of
slices and hydrologic methods for estimation of maximum probable
floods.

The probability of failure can be used to make more rational

decisions on site selection, materials selection, quality control,
operating rules, and for reducing risks to acceptable levels. Since
the procedure will estimate probability of failure from the beginning
of construction throughout the life of the project, it will be verv
useful in making decisions at any stage before the completion of the
project construction as well as through the rest of its life.

6

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
Literature containing examples of methods in which statistical
procedures were used to analyze any phase of earth dam construction
and operation or to evaluate the overall risk analysis procedure are
reviewed in this chapter.

The review is divided into sections on

risk analysis methods and failure mechanisms.
Risk Analysis Methods
General risk analysis
Rowe (1977) defines risk assessment as the total process of
quantifying risk and finding an acceptable level of that risk for
an individual group or society.

This is illustrated in terms of a

hierarchy of risk assessment terminology (see Figure 1).

He explains

that risk assessment involves both risk determination and risk
evaluation.

Risk determination involves risk identification and

risk estimation and is generally an empirical scientific activity
performed by planners.

Risk evaluation comprises risk aversion and

risk acceptance and is a normative (political) activity.

Other

pertinent definitions are:
1.

Risk - magnitude and probability of occurrence of unwanted
or negative outcomes of a water resources project

2.

Benefit - magnitude and probability of occurrence of desirable or positive outcomes of a water resources project

1:

Risk
assessment

I

I
Risk
evaluation

Risk
determination

I

I

J

Risk
estimation

Rh>k
iden ti fica t ion

Determine

Observe
New risks
Change in risk
parameters

Figure 1.

I

I

Risk
aversion
I Determine

Probability of
occurrences

Degree of risk
reduction

Magnitude of
consequence value

Degree of risk
avoidance

I

Risk
acceptance
Establish
Risk references
Risk referents

A hierarchy of risk assessment terminology (after Rowe, 1977).

'-.l
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3.

Uncertainty - aspect of a water resources project which is
unknown in the sense that its magnitude and probability of
occurrence cannot be estimated with any reasonable degree of
confidence

Bowles, Anderson, and Canfield (1978) introduced a phased risk
analysis approach which utilizes the growing project data base to
determine the reliability of a given earth dam at any point in the
project life from conception through completion and operation.

They

also adopted a risk analysis format proposed by Rowe (1977) which
consists of a set of event-outcome-exposure-consequence paths which
allows the analysis to link the occurrence probabilities of each event
which could lead to dam failure to the final consequences measured in
commensurate and noncommensurate terms.

This approach could be

applied to all types of engineering projects.
McCuen (1980) suggests that risk assessment with regard to earth
dams should be performed using a Bayesian decision theory approach.
He proposes that the decision process of selecting design criteria
be considered to consist of a set of alternative design criteria
(actions), a set of possible outcome events that are associated with
each action, and a utility function that describes the value of each
outcome.

Different design criteria would be adopted depending on

the potential damages which might be received in the event of a dam
failure.

McCuen does not appear to address the issue of changes in

the utility function with time.
A procedure for measuring and displaying the potential adverse
contributions resulting from dam failures was presented by the Water
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Resources Council (1980) in which the types of adverse effects were
described and dams were defined according to height as well as storage
capacity.

Failure condition possibilities were also defined and the

procedures for evaluating the potential consequences resulting from
dam failures were outlined.
Probabilistic slope

stab~lity. analysi~

Vanmarcke (1977) introduced a three-dimensional static approach
to the probabilistic analysis of earth slopes.

-

This was done by using

a two-dimensional mechanical slip failure model with the third
dimension included by considering the variability of the averages of
soil properties along the axis of the embankment.

He defined a

statistic called the scale of fluctuation which indicates the rate of
fluctuation of the soil properties about the mean value due to
natural or in-place variabi lity in the soil properties.

The scale of

fluctuation can be considered to be the contributing parameter in the
variance reduction function which describes the decrease in the
variance of the varying. average of soil properties as the averaging
distance is increased.

Vanmarcke's method involves estimate of a

critical width (along the embankment axis) of failure at which the
probability of failure of the embankment is maximized.

The method

requires the designer to include the end resistance of the failure
mass in the analysis.

The probability of failure is maximized due to

the reduction in the influence of the end resistance on the mean
factor of safety.

As the width is increased, the variance of the

factor of safety decreases as described by the variance reduction
function.
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Vanmarcke (1979) demonstrated how his probabilistic approach to
earth slope analysis could be adapted to any deterministic plane
strain stability analysis method by using the ordinary method of
slices to estimate the probability Pf(B) that a failure will occur
anywhere along an embankment of length B.

The method accounts for

sources of uncertainty in the resisting moment due to natural or

in~

place variability in the soil strength parameters, pore pressure and
unit weight provided the variability of these factors can be described.
Sharp et al. (1980) have ext·ended Vanmarcke's method to the
analysis of the stability of zoned embankments in terms of effective
stresses.

Probabilities of failure were found for each trial failure

surface under static loading conditions.
A-Grivas (1980) performed a case study using the probabilistic
seismic stability model of A-Grivas, Howland and Toleser (1979).

The

safety of the slope was measured in terms of its probability of
failure with the numerical values being obtained through a Monte
Carlo simulation of failure.

The model was capable of accounting

for significant uncertainties associated with conventional methods.
Some of these uncertainties that are taken into account are:
1.

The variability of material strength parameters

2.

The location of potential failure surfaces

3.

Value of the maximum ground acceleration during an earthquake

Three different types of seismic sources were investigated by A-Grivas:
1.

Point source

2.

Line (or fault) source
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3.

Area source

Based on the Monte Carlo simulation of failure, "probability of
failure" vs. "distance between source and site" relationships were
plotted for all three types of seismic sources.
Inflow design flood analysis
Linsley and Franzini (1972) present methods for developing inflow
design flood hydrographs as well as flow duration curves for specific
drainage basins.

Examples of these types of curves are given for

various rivers and their corresponding drainage basins.

Other

hydrologic methods useful in predicting volume inflows over specific
time intervals are also presented.
Failure Mechanisms
The geotechnical engineering literature contains much valuable
information on past dam failures and failure mechanisms.

This

literature has been used in developing procedures for estimating the
transition probabilities between events and system responses in the
risk analysis procedure developed in the next chapter.

Some of the

failure mechanisms used in this study are discussed below.
Landslides
Jumikus (1979) presented several factors which determine the
stability of natural slopes of rock walls.

Those factors which are

helpful in providing a basis for estimating the probability of the
event "landslide into reservoir" are listed in Chapter IV.

A static

method for analyzing the stability of a natural slope with a geological
discontinuity was also described.
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Rapid drawdown
Sherard (1953) performed a study of upstream slides on twelve
earth dams.

He found that the majority of failures were caused by a

drawdown between maximum water surface and mid-height of the dam at
average rates varying between 0.3 and 0.5 feet per day.
Sherard et al. (1963) found that most drawdown slides have
occurred when the reservoir was lowered the first time, though a few
have occurred after many years of successful operation.

In some of

the latter, the delay may have been due to a decrease in the shear
strength of a clay

emban~ment

or foundation with time.

In every case

they studied, however, the slide was caused by a drawdown which was
either faster or over a greater range than had occurred previously.
Core cracking
Kulhawy and Grutowski (1976) discussed the phenomenon of load
transfer with respect to zoned earth dams.

They explained that the

load transfer is due to differences in stiffnesses of the material in
adjacent zones.

When a condition exists where the dam has a soft core

(low modulus) and a stiff shell (high modulus), the core will tend to
settle with respect to the shell during construction.

The results is

that the core wi 11 tend to "hang" on the shell along the zone bound-"
aries.

Placement of the embankment in successive layers tends to

accentuate this process with stresses in the core being less than
those due to gravitational forces alone.

If the reservoir is filled

rapidly under these conditions, the water pressure could exceed the
low stresses in the core.

This could lead to hydraulic fracturing in

the core and possibly piping.

If the reverse is true (i.e. soft shell
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and stiff core) the shell would hang on the core causing overstressing
to occur.

The result could be either plastic yield or brittle cracking

of the core.
Seismic loading
Schnabel and Seed (1973) developed relationships between distance
to causative fault and maximum acceleration for accelerations in rock.
These relationships pertain to earthquakes in the western United States.
Seed, Idriss, and Kiefer (1969) characterized bedrock motions by
using several significant parameters:
1.

Maximum amplitude of the accelerations

2.

The predominant frequency or predominant period of the motion

3.

Duration of the motion

They developed relationships for predominant periods vs. distance to
causative fault for various earthquake magnitudes.
Algermissen and Perkins (1973) proposed a technique for seismic
zoning.

A source area and/or active fault are used to predict the

se1sm1C potenti~l for a given site.
Haley and Hunt (1974) proposed a method to estimate the potential
for the occurrences of earthquakes and their ground shaking characteristics.

They were able to estimate the average number of earthquakes

that would occur for a given magnitude earthquake and bedrock acceleration.

This was applied from a predetermined study area and/or a

major active fault.

Exceedance probability vs. bedrock acceleration

curves can then be developed for any given time interval such as 50 or
100 years for determining design earthquake parameters.

14

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
Methodology of the risk analysis procedure is characterized by
its framework. details of the probabilistic procedure. and utilization
of a growing data base.

These components combine to describe a system

of methods which can be used to evaluate the reliability of an earth
dam as well as consequences resulting from its reliability.
Framework of the Risk Analysis Procedure
The framework of the risk analysis procedure is based on that
proposed by Bowles, Anderson, and Canfield (1978) for earth dam projects.

It

is comprised of the following five major elements:

1.

Event

2.

System response

3.

Outcome

4.

Exposure (factors)

5.

Consequence

The elements are related by transition probability linkages in such
a way that

th~

probability of specific consequences can be traced

back to the probability of the initial event as illustrated in
Figure 2.

EVENT

SYSTEM RESPONSE

OUTCOME

EXPOSURE

CONSEQUENCE
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Figure 2.

Event-system response-outcome-exposure-consequence diagram.
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Event
Events can be considered to be the beginnings of potential
failure conditions in dams and thus the "first cause" of the ultimate
consequences of an earth dam failure.

The magnitude of the process

which forms the events is often described on a continuous scale (e.g.
Richter s.cale for earthquakes).

The event itself includes all magni-

tudes of the process which exceed the value at which failure will
occur.

An effort has been made to use every possible event which

could occur sometime in the life of an earth dam but, as in all risk
assessments, there is a problem of incompleteness in that it is
impossible to foresee all possible events.

Most of the events

identified in Figure 2 are considered to be independent events (defined as the probability of two or more events occurring simultaneously
being negligible).

A few are considered to be correlated (defined

as causally associated).
this study are:

Examples of the events which were used in

flood, earthquake (ground shaking at damsite),

failure of upstream dam, etc. (see Figure 2).
System response
The reaction of the earth dam structure due to the occurrence of
one or more events has been called the system response.

Again an

effort was made to use as many probable system responses as could
be conceived.

Some examples of system responses are rise in pool

level, slope stability failure, foundation spreading, etc. (see
Figure 2).
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Outcome
The result of a system response or combination of responses
establishes the probability of occurrence of each degree of failure.
The three degrees of failure considered are:

no failure, partial

failure (no breaching or overtopping of dam). and complete failure
by breaching and overtopping of the dam.

Probabilities of each

failure condition are accumulated based on the degree of the response
of the dam.

-

Exposure
The consequence of a dam failure will be determined by the
structural damage, loss of
downstream damages.

~ti1ity

of the reservoir water, and by the

The location of the reservoir and the factors

which affect the magnitude of losses by the downstream activities, at
the time it fails, are the exposure factors.

An attempt has been

made in this study to use certain factors which determine the exposure
to dam failure.

Examples of these exposure factors are:

time of

year, dam location, and flood warning time.
Consequence
The u1tUnate loss in terms of lives lost, economic losses (e.g.
structural damage, loss of revenue), and natural aesthetic value are
the consequences of dam failure.

The degree of exposure at the time

of either a partial or complete failure determines the magnitude of
the consequences.

Those types of losses which are significant with

respect to an earth dam failure are included in this study.
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Details of the Probabilistic Procedure
Correlated event probabilities
In order to take into account instances in which one or more
events may occur simultaneously, a chart has been developed in which
comparisons have been made between each of the events (see Figure 3).
The instances in which a significant correlation can be considered
to exist have been so indicated by "CE" (correlated event) in the
square where the two events intersect.

The subscripts on the "CE"

in Figure 3 are to show that each correlation is different in magnir

:

tude, but nevertheless significant in terms of the degree of correlation.
A significant correlation is defined to exist if there is a
possibility that two or more simultaneous events can result from a
common cause.

For example, heavy precipitation is a common cause for

the events "landslide into reservoir" and "flood" (see Figure 4a).
The degree of correlation indicates the likelihood that both events
will occur simultaneously.

Care should be taken to distinguish

between correlated events and independent events.

Even though there

is a remote probability that "end of construction" and "earthquake

(ground shaking at damsite)" could occur simultaneously, it should be
noted that there is no common cause to trigger both of the events (see
Figure 4b).
The simultaneous occurrence of two joint events will be treated
as a separate event in the risk analysis procedure.

It should be

noted that these joint events are not shown in Figure 2 and that the

19
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Figure 3.

Classification of joint event pairs into independent and
correlated pairs.
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b) example of independent joint events

Figure 4.

Event relationships.
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single events which are shown exclude the probability of the simultaneous occurrence of correlated events.

The transition from corre-

lated joint event to system response will be linked to the same
system responses as were the separate events.

The probability of

the occurrence of correlated joint events of a "landslide into reservoir" and a "flood" is given by:

where
L

= event of a landslide into reservoir

F

= event

of a flood

The squares in Figure 3 which contain dashes {-} indicate that
two events are independent and although they could occur simultaneously,
the probability that this will occur is insignificant since it is the
product of two very small probabilities.
Independent event probabilities
The probability that single and correlated joint events will occur
{PEi' PCEi} must be found to begin the risk analysis procedure.

PF,i

values are to be found for each independent event and a transitional
procedure is performed for each of the probabilistic linkages to
obtain a probability of system response based on that event {transitional probability},

Descriptions of the procedures which will be

used are outlined in Chapter IV of this study.

Likewise, PCEi

values are found for the correlated joint events and are treated as
additional independent events in the analysis.

22

System response probabilities
In the case of this risk analysis procedure, there are fifteen
transition probabilities from single events as well as six from correlated joint events.

Based on the transitional procedure performed for

each linkage which joins independent and correlated joint events with a
corresponding system response, a transitional probability of a given
system response is obtained.

To obtain the total probability of a

particular system response, the summation of the transitional probabilities provides an estimate of the total probability of anyone system
response:
n

m

r Ps . + r PSC .

i=1

1.

i=1

1.

where
PSi

= transitional

probability of system response from linked

independent events
PSCi

= transitional

probability of system response from linked

correlated events
n

= number of independent events linked to the specific

system response
m

= number

of correlated events linked to the specific

system response
PSR

= Probability that a specific system response will occur

In the case of the system response of "slope stability failure" for
example:
7

Pss

P(slope stability failure)

3

r PSS i + L PSSC.
i=l
i=1
1.
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where
7

= P(slope

L: PSS.

i=l

stability failure given that rapid drawdown

1.

occurs)
+ P(slope stability failure given that end. of construc-

tion occurs)
+ p( slope stability failure given that steady state

seepage occurs)
+ P(slope stability failure given that inadequate

quality control occurs)
+ P(slope stability failure given that design error

occurs) .
+ P(slope stability failure given that improper eva1u-

ation of soil properties occurs)
+ P(slope stability failure given that earthquake

occurs)
and where
3
L: PSSC

i=l

i

= P(slope

stability factor given that simultaneous

rapid drawdown and landslide into reservoir occur)
+ P(slope stability failure given that simultaneous

1

earthquake and landslide into reservoir occur)
+ P(slope stability failure given that simultaneous

earthquake and upstream dam failure occur)
Outcome probabilites
Once the probability for each specific system response has been
obtained, the method for finding the outcome probabilities is very
similar to that used for finding the system response probabilities.
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Transition probabilities for the appropriate failure condition (no
failure, partial failure, or complete failure) are found using methods
discussed in Chapter IV.

This is done for each of the linkages which

join the system responses with the three outcome conditions.

Since

the system responses are treated independently, the probability of any
one of the three outcome conditions is equal to the summation of the
transition outcome probabilities which were linked to that condition:

Po .
J

=

where
PPOi

= transition

probability of outcome from linked system

response
n

= number

PO j

= probability

of system responses linked to the specific outcome
that a specific outcome will occur

In the case of the outcome of "no failure" for example'
3

PNF = P(no failure)

=

E PNF.
i=l
1.

where
3

E PNF.
i=l
1.

= P(no

failure given that rise in pool level occurs)

+ P(no failure given that core cracking occurs)
+ P(no failure given that differential settlement occurs)

In this manner, probabilities for each failure condition can be obtained .
.. 1

Estimation of Consequences
The final consequences are estimated using the probability values
obtained for partial failure and complete failure in conjunction with
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the appropriate exposure factors.

The probability of failure and the

degree of exposure at the time of failure dictate the magnitude of the
consequences.

The consequences can be estimated by multiplying

the estimated consequences (assuming that the failure occurred) by the
probability of failure as shown in Table 1.

The total consequence

estimation will be the summation of dollars lost due to both the
partial failure and complete failure conditions as well as the lost
lives and acres of aesthetically pleasing land due to the complete
failure.

The consequences of each failure condition are estimated

individually because the partial failure and complete failure are
statistically mutually exclusive.
Growing Data Base
The available data pertaining to an earth dam increases with
time.

In the very early stages of a dam project there may be no

specific information other than historical data on the reliability of
earth dams of similar height, design and location.

As time goes on.

however, such information as borrow material properties, embankment.
compaction, in-place density, foundation investigation, flood studies.
etc. will develop and provide a basis for using the entire framework
of the risk analysis procedure.

In the early stages of the project, a

risk analysis could be based on empirical evidence of reliability.
As the data base expands, the procedures used to evaluate risk can
become more detailed by considering each of the pathways in Figure 2
using increasingly improved parameter estimates and consequently the
analysis can be expected to be more representative of a particular dam
structure.
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Table 1.

Estimation of consequences.

Estimated Consequences

Consequences

Failure
Probability
Partial Failure

1.

2.

Repairable structural damage to
dam (dollars)

(dollars)

x

Loss of revenue
(dollars)
Complete Failure

1.

Irreparable
structural
damage to dam
(dollars)

2.

Loss of revenue
(dollars)

3.

Property damage
(dollars)

4.

Loss of life
(No. of lives)

5.

Loss of natural
aesthetics (No.
of acres)

x

Total Estimation of Consequences

==

==

(dollars)
+(no. of lives)
+(no. of acres)

dollars (partial failure)
+ dollars (complete failure)
+ no. of lives (complete
failure)
+ no. of acres (complete
failure)
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CHAPTER IV
DESCRIPTION OF RISK ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
Procedures for Estimat

Probabilities

In order to estimate the probability of occurrence of each
outcome condition and the resulting consequences. the probabilities
of each joint event, correlated joint event. transition probability,
and system response must be estimated.

Chapter III of this thesis

explains how these probabilities are combined.

The following section

describes possible procedures which can be used to estimate these
probabilities for use in the risk analysis procedure.
Probability of events
Event 1.

The probability of the occurrence of event 1 "land-

slide into reservoir," is PEl'

There are four basic types of

landslides (see Figure 5):
1.

Falls

2.

Rotational slides

3.

Translational slides

4.

Flows

As a result of the slope condition, a probability exists that a slope
located somewhere on the rim of the reservoir will fail.

Probabilities

of failure will be different for each type of landslide which can
occur at any given location on the rim of the reservoir.

The value

of PEl could be obtained from a probabilistic slope stability analysis.
This analysis could be performed on those areas around the reservoir

-

FOIl

-==-::::::0=:::-_ .__~~_L?_;;
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which are considered to have the greatest landslide potential based on
empirical (e.g. case history) landslide frequency information as well
as factors such as those listed below.

These factors, which determine

the stability of the slope .and those unique to the slope in question,
should be used in conjunction with the results of the probabilistic
slope stability analysis.
of natural slopes.

Several factors can determine the stability

Jumikis (1979) suggests several factors:

1.

Rock and soil type of which or in which the slope is made

2.

Structure, stratification and attitude of the rock and soil
formations (e.g. strata dip angle)

3.

Presence of a potential failure surface in the slope (frequency of geological discontinuities) and the steepness of
its angle of dip toward the reservoir

4.

Presence of breccia zones and clay seams

5.

Unit weight of slope material

6.

position of groundwater table

7.

Moisture content (degree of saturation) in the slope
material

8.

Vibrations and seismic forces

9.

various environmental conditions and processes sculpturing
the face of slopes (i.e. weathering, frost, and chemical
action of pore water on soil and rock materials)

Therefore, based on these factors as well as other important considerations peculiar to the slope in question, an estimate of the
landslide potential along the rim of the reservoir could be made.
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Event 2.
is PE2'

The probability of the occurrence of event 2 "flood,"

The probability of PE2 could be estimated using state-of-

the-art methods to predict the probable maximum flood for the region
in which the dam is located.

This probable maximum flood would be

used for dams in which the expected consequences for dam failure would
be potentially large, or in other words, dams in which a risk analysis
would be strongly recommended.

Linsley and Franzini (1972) present

methods for determining the probable maximum flood by means of a
meteorological estimate of the physical limit of rainfall over a
drainage basin.
Event 3.

The probability of the occurrence of event 3

systems failure," is PE3'

'~ydraulic

It will be assumed in this study that the

main concern with respect to the hydraulic system failure will be with
regard to the outlet gate.

To obtain a value for PE3' the uncertainty

of the quality or durability of a typical outlet gate must be dealt
with.

It will also be assumed that a failure in this case means that

no water is allowed past the dam.

A probability distdbution could be

developed on the outlet gate based on manufacturers tests or tests
performed by the engineer.

The distribution would be the probability

of failure vs. the number of years since its installation (see Figure
6).

Factors such as climate or location of the dam would need to be

considered in the development of the distribution.

Therefore, PE

3

would be equal to the probability of failure of the outlet gate plus
the probability of failure of the remaining hydraulic systems.

The

value of the latter probability would be an estimate based on judgment
and on how many other hydraulic systems there are and their relative
import ance .
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Event 4,

The probability of the occurrence of event 4 "improper

dam operation," is PE4'

To obtain the value for the probability

that the dam will not be operated prop.erly, an understanding about
human error would be needed.

Based on case histories of

engineerin~

projects which have failed due to operator failure (mistakes) and on
basic human behavioral studies, estimations of PE4 could be made.
Nuclear power plant operation of recent years has necessitated studies
of a similar nature in order to predict the probability of failure due
to operator failures,

Although probably more complex than earth dam

considerations, results of these studies for nuclear power operation
failures could be very valuable in obtaining a value for FE .
'4

Event 5.

The probability of the occurrence of event 5 "con-

struction delays" is P.E .
5

Several factors must be considered which

contribute to construction delays, they are:
1.

Problems with work force (striking, etc.)

2.

Problems with equipment

3.

Accidents and/or mistakes

4.

Weather (or other natural phenomena)

5.

Funding or budget delays

Based on the particular group of workers which are selected for the
job, an evaluation can be made using the first three factors listed
above.

This evaluation would be based on the general performance

of the work force on similar jobs as well as the current general
attitude of the labor market.

Also, available empirical information

(e.g. cases histories) would be beneficial.

Based on this information,

an estimation of PES could be made by means of a judgment decision.
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Event 6,

The probability of the occurrence of event 6 "failure

o f ups t ream d am, '"

1S PE6'

since PE6 is the probability that a dam

will fail upstream, it would be found using the risk analysis procedure
for that specific dam, if it is an earth dam.

All other types of dams

could be assessed PE6 using judgment based on inspection procedures
such as risk assessment methods similar to those currently being used
by several government institutions.
Event 7.
drawdown,"

1S

The probability of the occurrence .of event 7 "rapid
PE7'

The value of this probability would be estimated

based on the characteristics and magnitude of the usage that the
reservoir will receive.

For example, if the reservoir is used for

agricultural water supply, rapid drawdown would occur nearly every
year and PE

would be high,

7

considered in evaluating PE

Some of the factors \Y'hich need to be
7

would include:

I.

Climate

2.

Location (land use in vicinity)

3,

Stream inflow and duration as a function of the time of year

4,

Reservoir water usage (outflow and duration as a function of
the time of year)

Event 8.

The probability of the occurrence of event

construction," is PES'

~

"end of

The end of construction condition is important

because of the buildup of pore pressures within the embankment.

The

value of PE

is the probability that excessive pore pressures will
8
develop within the embankment during and immediately following construction.

ment are:

The factors which affect pore pressure within the embank-
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1.

Type of embankment material

2.

Rate of construction

3.

Water content of embankment material

4.

Physical characteristics of embankment

PES can be estimated using judgment based on the factors listed above
as well as available empirical information (e.g. case histories).
Event 9.

The probability of the occurrence of event 9 "steady

state seepage)" PE9' depends largely upon dam usage.

For example,

if the reservoir is used mostly for recreational purposes or other
uses which would require a relatively stable pool level, the value of
PE9 would be close to one.

In this case) however, there is a period

of time after the reservoir has been filled before the steady state
seepage condition can be reached.

Other conditions, which cause

regular fluctuations in the pool level of the reservoir (e.g. agricultural use), would probably seldom allow the steady state seepage to
occur.

For these conditions the value of PE9 would be low.

Event 10.

The probability of the occurrence of event 10 "inade-

quate quality control," is PElO'

Some of the factors which contribute

to inadequate quality control include:
1.

Human error on the part of the inspector and/or contractor

2.

Incompetent inspector and/or contractor

3.

Intentional carelessness (one example:

inspector "pads"

reports to please contractor)
4.

Insufficient scope of the quality control program

It is assumed here that all the responsibility with respect to quality
control falls on the inspector and the contractor,

The contractor
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includes all of the workers.

Based on past experience with inspectors

and contractors as well as other available empirical information, PElO
would be estimated using judgment.
Event 11.

The probability of the occurrence of event 11 "design

error," is PEll'

A design error is a design which is not correct with

respect to the state-of-the-art design procedures.

The major uncertainty

which would need to be dealt with here is the frequency of human error
among design engineers.

Studies involving the design of nuclear power

plants would be very useful in estimating the value of PEll .
Event 12.

The probability of the occurrence of event 12 "improper

evaluation of soil properties," is PE 2'
1

Some of the factors which

con tribute to improper evaluation of soil properties are:
1.

Inadequate field studies (site, foundations, borrow area
investigations, etc.)

2.

Incompetent engineers and/or technicians

3.

Soil samples that are not representative

4.

Testing errors

5.

Human errors

PE12 would be estimated using statistical data on soil parameters as
well as judgment.
Event 13.

The probability of the occurrence of event 13 "earth-

quake (ground shaking at the damsite)," is PE13'

Based on studies

which have been done by Haley and Hunt (1974), Schnabel and Seed
(1972), Algermissen and Perkins (1973), and Seed, Idriss, and Kiefer
(1969) an exceedance probability vs. bedrock acceleration curve can be
developed for a given damsite.

Therefore, values of PE13 can be

obtained for specific design lives for each expected bedrock
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acceleration.

This enables the designer to predict the ground shaking

which will occur at the damsite.
Event 14.

The probability of the occurrence of event 14 "burrow-

ing animals," is PE

. The biggest uncertainty associated with this
14
probability is the type of animals which are found at or near the
damsite.

If the types of animals which burrow are found at or near

the damsite the probability that the event "burrowing animals" will
occur will be relatively high.

A value for PE

14
estimated based on these types of circumstances.
Event 15.

will need to be

The probability of the occurrence of event 15 "sabotage

and vandalism," is PE

The best possible source of information
15
available to assist in determining the value of PElS would be empirical
in nature (e.g. case histories).

PElS would be estimated using

judgment and would be based on the number and frequency of situations
in the past where sabotage and vandalism of earth dams has occurred.
Probability of correlated joint events
Six different joint event combinations were determined to be
correlated.

As explained in Chapter III, the probability of a corre-

lated joint event PCE. is the probabilities of the intersection of the
l.

two events which in this case are not independent.

Therefore, the

probability of the correlated joint events is less than or equal to
the probability of either of the separate joint events.

In the case

of the correlated joint event of "landslide into reservoir" and
"flood:"

= peEl n

E2 ) and

PCE I
P CE2 ::£
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where
PCEI

= Probability

of correlated event 1 (landslide

into reservoir and flood)
PEl

=

Probability of event I (landslide into reservoir)

PE

= Probability of event 2 (flood)
2
The value of PCEi will be estimated by a judgment decision in which the

extent to which each of the events are believed to be correlated.
Probabilities of system response

-

In order to obtain a probability of system response (PSR) resulting from various event and/or correlated event probabilities,
transition procedures must be performed for each of the linkages
between the events and the system responses.

A transition probability

matrix has been developed in Figure 7 which illustrates each of the
linkages and indicates the procedure to determine the partial probability corresponding to each linkage.

The linkages will be identified

using.matrix notation (x.y) where the x values are the system responses
and the y values are the events of Figure 7.

Descriptions of the

procedures which could be used to obtain the part ial probabilities for
each linkage in the matrix (Figure 7) will be covered in this section.
Linkage <I,D.

The event is "landslide into reservoir."

system response is "rise in pool level."

The

Since landslides can take on

various forms (i.e. fall, rotational slide, translational slide, and
flow), the major uncertainty associated with this linkage is the mass
volume which is released into the reservoir.

This is very important

because the rise in pool level is proportional to the water displaced
by the landslide mass.

A rigorous approach to this problem is not
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event occurs.
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possible at this time.

Therefore, slope stability analysis combined

with judgment would be used to estimate the transition probability
-

,

of system response (PPLl)'
Linkage (1,2).

The event is "flood. II

is "rise in pool 1eve 1. If

The system response

Flood routing techniques would be used

to evaluate the pool level characterisitics resulting from a flood.
Linsley and Franzini (1972) present methods for flood routing through
controlled reservoirs.

Special considerations would be required

while evaluating the shape of the critical hydrograph for a given
flood.

Moderate inflow sustained over a long time interval could

have a much greater affect on the total volume increase of the
water in the reservoir than high inflows over a relatively short
time interval.

The transition probability (PPLZ) would be estimatec1

based on the results of various flood routing configurations which
show potential for a noticeable rise in pool level.
Linkage 0,3).

The event is "hydraulic systems failure."

system response is "rise in pool level."

The

The major uncertainty

associated with this linkage is the net inflow at the time of failure.
For this procedure it will be assumed that hydraulic systems failure
means that no water is allowed to pass through the outlet works.
Therefore, the inflow at the time of failure will essentially be the
streamflow if direct precipitation and groundwater are neglected
during the critical period.

Since the events are independent the

relationship for this transition probability is:
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where
PPL

2

= the

probability of the flood which causes a noticeable

rise in pool level occurring
PE3

= the

probability that the event, hydraulic systems fail-

ure, wi 11 occur
Linkage (1,4).

The event is "improper darn operat ion. "

system response is "rise in pool level."

The

It will also be assumed here

that improper darn operation means that no water will pass through the
dam's outlet works.

Therefore, the relationship is as before:

where
PE4

= the

probability that the event, improper darn operation,

will occur.
Linkage (6,4).

The event is "improper dam operation."

system response is "structural failure of the apertenances."

The
There

may be cases in which the apertenant structures are not operated
correctly and stresses which are not normally induced on the apertenant
structures take place.

High stresses could result from abnormal

pressures produced by a phenomenon such as a "water hammer."

To

evaluate the probability that the apertenances would fail under these
types of adverse conditions, empirical information in the form of
either case histories or manufacturer's estimates of apertenance
structural performance would be used to estimate the transition
probability, (PSF )'
l
Linkage 0,5). The event is "construction delays."
response is "rise in pool level."

The system

Since the dam is still under
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construction, in this case the only outlet for the water is through
the diversion tunnel.

The relationship will still be the same:

where
PES

the probability that the event, construction delays, will
occur

It should be noted here that the value of PPL2 will be different than
before. since the flood magnitude which would cause a noticeable rise
in pool level would be different than for the full reservoir.
Linkage (1,6).

The event is "failure of upstream dam."

system response is "rise in pool level."

The

This linkage would be

analyzed using state-of-the-art flood routing techniques.

The failure

of the upstream dam would be assumed to be an instantaneous, complete
release of its impounded water.

Some of the factors that would affect'

the probability of the rise in pool level would be:
1.

Volume of the upstream reservoir

2.

Distance between the reservoirs

3.

Characteristics of the river channel between the reservoirs
(e.g. narrow. deep, winding, etc.)

A good approximation for the transition probability of a rise in pool
level due to failure of an upstream dam is:

where
PE6

=

the probability that the event, failure of upstream dam,
will occur

It would not be a good approximation, however, if the factors listed
above caused the flood wave to dissipate.

This indicates the necessity
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of the flood routing analysis in order to determine how the flood wave
is affected by those factors.
Linkage (2,7).

The event is "rapid drawdown."

response is "slope stability failure."

The system

The uncertainties which need

to be considered with regard to a slope stability failure resulting from
rap id drawdown are:
1.

Variability of the soil properties as a function of their
location in the embankment

2.

Drawdown characteristics (rate, magnitude, etc.)

3.

Existing condition of the dam as a result of the drawdown
(stresses, pore pressures, etc.)

The embankment should be analyzed using a probabilistic slope stability
analysis developed by Sharp

et al. (1980).

This computer program will

provide an estimate of the probability of failure for several failure
surfaces based on the static conditions imposed by the rapid drawdown
condition.

To perform the analysis on existing embankments. a

field testing program would be required to determine the in situ
soil properties.
for the analysis.

Laboratory testing facilities would also be needed
This transition probability of slope stability

failure (PSS l ) can be expressed as:
PSS l

= (PE 7)

PFrd

where
PE7

= probability that the event "rapid drawdown" will occur

PF

= greatest

rd

probability of failure obtained from the

probabilistic slope stability analysis based on the
rapid drawdown condition
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Linkages (2,8 and 9).
"steady state seepage."
failure."

-

.

The events are "end of construction" and

The system response is "slope stability

The uncertainties which should be considered with

re~ard

to

these events are:
1.

The variability of the soil properties as a function of
location in the embankment

- 1

2.

The existing condition of the dam resultinJt from the event
(stresses, pool level, etc.)

The static loading conditions resulting from the event in question
would be estimated and used in the probabilistic slope stability
analysis.

The soil properties of the embankment obtained from the

testing program would also be used in the program.

These transition

probabilities of slope stability failure (PSS Z and PSS3) can be
expressed as:

where
PES

= probability that the event "end of construction" will occur

PS ec

= greatest

probability of failure obtained.from the probabil-

istic slope stability analysis of the slope based on the
end of construction condition

where
PEg

= probability that the event "steady state seepage" will

occur
PS ss = greatest probability of failure obtained from the probabilistic slope stability analysis of the slope based on the
steady state seepage condition
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Linkages (3,8 and 9).
"steady state seepage."

The events are "end of construction" and

The system response is "foundation spreading."

The uncertainties as well as the analysis of these transition probabilities are identical to those of linkages (3,8) and (3,9) with the
exception that they would also apply to the foundation as well as the
embankment.

The expressions are:
PFSI

= (PES) PF ec

where
PF ec

= greatest

probability of failure obtained from the probabil-

istic slope stability analysis of the foundation based
on the end of construction condition

where
PF ss

= greatest

probability of failure obtained from the probabil-

istic slope stability analysis of the foundation based on the
steady state seepage condition
Linkage (4,8 and 9).

The events are "end of construction"

and "steady state seepage."

The system response is "core cracking."

The uncertainty to be considered in addition to those mentioned for
the transition slope stability probabilities

1S

core and shell materials relative to each other.

the behavior of the
These transition

probabilities of core cracking (PeCl and PCCZ) can be estimated from
estimates of the relative settlement between core and shell zones.
Investigation of embankment and foundation would be required to
predict such settlement.

Loading conditions would depend on which

event was being considered.

Settlement would be predicted based on
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two main conditions.

Usually the core and the shell material have

different stiffnesses.

Hydraulic fracturing could occur in the core

if it settled relative to the shell.

However, if the shell settled

relative to the stiff core, plastic yielding or brittle cracking could
occur.

Other factors such as compaction methods could have an affect

on the probability estimations (e.g. compacting wet or dry of optimum).
Linkage (5,9).
response is "piping."

The event is "steady state seepage."

The system

Since there are essentially no deterministic

methods available at this time to analyze piping in soil structures,
the transition probability of piping (PPl) will be estimated using a
judgment decision approach.

The estimate would be based on factors

such as:
1.

Zoned or homogenous dam

2.

Materials in embankment (how do materials vary from zone to
zone, if zoned dam)

3.

Filter characteristics, if any

4.

Foundation characteristics (fractured, grouted, etc.)

5.

Pool leve 1

Case histories in which dams have failed due to piping would be
valuable in estimating the probability.
Linkages (7,8 and 9).
"steady state seepage."
ment."

The events are "end of construction" and

The system response is "differential settle-

Once again, the transition probabilities of differential

settlement (PDS

1

and PDS2) would need to be estimated based on

results of static settlement analyses.

Using appropriate static

loading conditions according to the event in question, a static
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settlement analysis would be performed at selected locations on the
embankment.

Dunn, Anderson, and Kiefer (1980) describe current

available methods such as Bonsennesq or Westergaard which could be
used for granular soils, as well as Terzaghi's method which could be
used for cohesive soils.
developed.

A probabilistic settlement analysis could be

This would involve a probabilistic characterization of the

foundation soil profile using the method suggested by Vanmarcke (1977).
Linkages (1-7, 10).

The event is "inadequate quality control."

The system responses are all responses.

The major uncertainty here is

the extent to which the quality control is inadequate and the affect
this degree of inadequacy has on each system response.

For this study

it will be assumed that the transition probability for each system
response is equal to the probability of the event "inadequate quality
control." This assumption·is based on the consideration that if the
event takes place, it will cause each appropriate system response to
take place as well.

Therefore, the probability of the event becomes

the transition probability of the system response.

This is a conser-

vative approach, but appropriate for this stage of development of the
risk analysis procedure.

Therefore they can be expressed as:

PEW = PPL7 = PSS 4 = PFS3 = PCC3

Linkages 0-7, 11).

= PP2

= PSF2 == PDS3

The event is "design error."

responses are all responses.

The system

The consideration of these transition

probabilities would be handled much the same as they were for the
event "inadequate quality control."

Again, the main uncertainties

would be the number of design errors and the significance they would
have on the system responses.

The transition probabilities of each
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system response can be estimated as before as being equal to the
probability of the event "design error."
PEll = PPLS

= PSSs = PFS4 = PCC4 = PP3 = PSF3

Linkages (2-4 and 6, 12).
soil properties."

They can be expressed as:
= PDS4

The event is "improper evaluat ion of

The system responses are all applicable responses.

The evaluation of the transition probabilities as well as the uncertainties to be considered would be similar to linkages (1-7,10) and
linkages (1-7,11).

The transition probabilities can therefore be

expressed as:
PE 12

= PSS 6

Linkage (l, 13).
damsite."

= PFSS = PCCS

= PP4

= PDSS

The event is "earthquake (ground shaking at

The system response

1S

"rise in pool level."

As explained

earlier, relationships of exceedance probability vs. bedrock acceleration
can be obtained.

Therefore, the main uncertainty is the bedrock

acceleration required to cause a noticeable rise in pool level (wave
of water in reservoir),.

The estimation of this transition probability

for rise in pool level (PPL9) would be a judgment decision aided by
case histories, a theoretical analysis of water waves induced by
tectonic displacements and the seismic history at or near the damsite.
Linkage (2,13).
damsite."

The event is "earthquake (ground shaking at

The' system response is "slope stability failure."

The

transition probability of slope stability failure (PSS ) can be found
7
using a probabilistic seismic stability analysis such as the one
outlined by A-Grivas, Howland, and Toleser (1979).
counts for the following uncertainties:
1.

Variability of material strength parameters

This model ac-
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2.

Exact location of potential failure surfaces

3.

Value of the maximum ground acceleration during an earthquake

In the analysis, the material comprising the slope is assumed to be
statistically homogeneous and potential failure surfaces are taken to
be of

a~

exponential shape (log-spiral).

The maximum acceleration

during the earthquake is the seismic load, and its probability of
occurrence can be estimated using the method proposed by Algermissen
and Perkins (1973) and by Haley and Hunt (1974).

A-Grivas, Howland,

and Toleser (1979) assume that the slope is rigid and, therefore, the
maximum ground acceleration is equal to that of the slope.

Using

attenuation relationships for the region, curves can be developed for
"probability of failure" va.

"distance between source and site"

(point source), "distance between fault and site" (fault source) or
"radius of area source" (area source) such as those shown in Figure 8.
Hence, for a given earthquake magnitude or maximum accelerat ion,
probabilities of failure can readily be found for the appropriate
sources.

Therefore, for a given earthquake magnitude, the transition

probability can be expressed as:
PSS 7

= (PE 13)(PSA)

where
PSA • probability of failure calculated from the probabilistic
seismic stability analysis.
Linkase (3, 13).
damsite)."

The event is "earthquake (ground shaking at

The system response is "foundation spreading."

This would

be analyzed in a manner similar to linkage number (2,13) with one
exception.

More attention and consideration should be made in terms
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of the existing foundation conditions.

The wide variability in the

types of foundations which could be encountered (from bedrock to soft,
deep unconsolidated material) in damsites could have a
affect on the potential for foundation

si~nificant

spreadin~ durin~

dynamic

loading conditions.
,!-inkage (4, 13).
damsite)."

The event is "earthquake

(~round shakin~

The system response is "core cracking."

at

Predications can

be made for ground acceleration characteristics based on earthquake
magnitudes.

Since the development of a deterministic method for

analyzing the cracking of the cOre material in an earth dam is still
in its infant stages, a judgment decision would be used to estimate
the transition probability of core cracking (PCC6"

Knowing the

strength characteristics of the core and shell materials would be
valuable in this estimate.

Testing programs involving both static and

cyclic shear tests would be desirable.
Linkage (7, 13).
damsite)."

The event is "earthquake (ground shaking at

The system response is "differential settlement."

The

value of the transition probability of differential settlement (PnR )
6
would again be estimated in this case.

Case histories

involvin~

settlement during an earthquake of materials similar to those found in
a dam embankment or foundation would be helpful in

estimatin~

the

probability of differential settlement (Pns ). Also, multidirectional
6
shaking tests such as those performed by Pyke, et al. (1974) could be
done on representative models.
J.inkage (5, 14).
response is "piping."

The event is "burrowing animals."

The system

The value of the transition probability of

pipin~
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(PP4) will depend very much on the circumstances which surround the
dam.

Since most animals which burrow do not burrow very deep, the

size of the dam can be an important factor.

The only animals which

tend to burrow quite deep are ground squirrels but they will stop once
they encounter seeping water or moist soil.

Therefore, for a large

dam with a stable pool level, the value of PP4 would be almost
zero.
Linkage (6, 15).

The event is "sabotage and vandalism."

system response is "structure failure of the apertenances.

The

The major

uncertainties here are:
1.

The degree to which vandalism can contribute to the structural
failure of the apertenances

2.

The motives for such events which are peculiar to a particular
dam or damsite

Since the motive of sabotage is destruction, it will be assumed that
the probability of sabotage alone is equal to the probability of
structural failure of the apertenances due to loads induced on the
structure resulting from sabotage.

This probability will not be the

same as for other loading conditions.

The degree of structural

failure of the apertenances resulting from vandalism will depend on
the following:
1.

Characteristics of the act

2.

Extent of the act

3.

Number of unnot iced repet it ions

Case histories will be the best tool in estimating the transition
probability of structural failure of the apertenances (PSF4)'

Con-
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siderations involving those factors listed above will also be valuable
in the judgment decision.
Probabilities of outcome
Once the probabilities for each system response have been determined by taking the summation of its own partial probabilities, the
outcome probabilities can be found in a similar manner.

To obtain the

outcome probability Po resulting from various system response probabilities, transition procedures must be performed for each linkage
between the system responses and the outcomes.

Another transition

probability matrix has been developed in Figure 9 which shows the
procedure used to determine the partial probability corresponding to
each linkage.

Descriptions of these procedures will be covered in

this section.

As has been done previously, matrix notation (x,y) will

be used to label the linkages in this section.
however, will correspond to Figure 9.

These linkages,

The "x" values will represent

the outcomes and the "y" values will represent the system responses.
Linkages (1-3, 1).

The system response is "rise in pool level."

The outcomes consist of all appropriate outcomes.

Major uncertainties

associated with these linkages would be:
1.

Existing freeboard at the time the rise begins

2.

Rate of pool level rise (most likely not constant)

3.

Duration of the rise

The freeboard would vary depending on uses such as irrigation, municipal, wildlife, etc.

From a general standpoint, the freeboard would

probably be a function of the time of year.

Based on model studies

and case histories, probability distribution curves could be developed
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Figure 9.
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Matrix of available and proposed methods for estimating
transition probabilities of outcomes given a system response
occurs.
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for different cases involving "rate of rise" and "rise duration" (see
Figure 10).

This would provide ranges of values for the probabilities

of each outcome condition for a given initial freeboard.

This would

be valuable in making the estimations for each transition probability
(PNFl' PPFl' PCFl)'
Linkages (2 and 3, 2).
failure."

The system response is "slope stability

The outcomes are "part ial failure" and "complete failure."

Probably the biggest factor which would determine the outcome of the
dam from a slope stability failure, is the location of the slip
surface.

The depth of failure, for example, can determine whether or

not the crest is affected and whether the dam is breached.

Both the

probabi listic slope stability analysis and the seismic analysis
provide this information as well as the probability of failure.
Therefore, based on case histories and model studies, probability
distributions could be developed (see Figure 11) as an aid in estimating these two transition outcome probabilities (PPF2' PCF2)'
,!.inkages (2 and 3, 3).

The system response is "foundation

spreading," The outcomes are "part ial failure" and "complete failure,"
An identical procedure could be used to estimate PPF3 and PCF3'
However, the considerations would now apply to the foundation as well
as the embankment,

Care must be taken to consider the variable nature

of the foundation conditions.
Linkage 0-3, 4).

The system response is "core cracking."

outcomes consist of all appropriate outcomes,

The

The uncertainty which

would probably have the biggest effect on the outcome will be the
Characteristics of the crack:

'1.

Key:

POI = area under curve over any failure condition range
NF

= no

PF

= partial failure condition

CF

= complete

failure condition

failure condition

>-

>-,
~
C/)

>-

~

~

(f)

(f)

Z

:z
w

Z

W

W

c
>-

o
>-

...J

...J

...J

a:l

a:l

o
>-

~

~

~

«
en
o

«
a:l
o

a:l

c..

c..

c..

0:.:

«

a:l

o

0:.:

NF

PF

a) RATE OF RISE

RISE DURATION

0:.:

NF

CF
LOW

PF

b) RATE OF RISE

LOW

LOW

HIGH
or

RISE DURATION

Figure 10.

NF

CF

HrCH

PF

CF

c) RATE OF RISE

RISE DURATION

HIGH
HIGH

LOW

Possible probability densities to determine partial outcome probabilities from system
response: rise in pool level (hypothetical).
V1
-...)

t:

Key:

PPF2 and PCF2
PF

=

CF

= area

under curve over any failure condition range

partial failure condition
complete failure condition

>....

>....

CJ)

CJ)

....>CJ)

Z

Z
W

o

W
o

>-

>-

Z
W

o

>-

....

....

--l
CD

~

~

CD

CD

CD

CD

CD

<t

I-

<t

o

<t

o

0::
CL

0::
CL

a)

PF

CF

Pss

LOW

FAILURE

SHALLOW

o
~________~~______________

Pss

LOW

PF
HIGH

or
FAILURE

Figure 11.

CF

PF

b)

0::
CL

DEEP

c)

CF

Pss

HIGH

FAILURE

DEEP

SHALLOW

Possible probability densities to determine partial outcome probabilities from system
response: slope stability failure (hypothetical).

Ln

00

59

1.

Length

2.

Location in the embankment

3.

Direction (longitudinal, transverse, etc,)

4.

Size of opening

5,

Others

Since there is no deterministic method at this time to predict the
physical characteristics of cracks in soil structures, probabilities
would be estimated using a judgment decision approach.

Case studies

as well as the amount of confidence placed in precautions (e.g. compacting core material wet of optimum) would be the most valuable aids
in making such an estimation.
Linkages (2 and 3, 5).

The system response is "piping."

outcomes are "partial failure" and "complete failure."

The

The extent to

which piping will occur is an uncertainty which will have a great
effect on the outcome of the dam.

Some of the factors involved would

be:
1.

Amount of fines removed

2.

Characteristics of void

3.

Location of void

4.

Others

Like core cracking, there are no deterministic methods available at
this time for piping failures.

If and when the piping was discovered

would also have a significant impact on the outcome.

Due to the

nature of piping failures, it is very likely that the vast majority of
such failures would result in complete failure, unless it had been
discovered in its early stages.

Based on these types of factors,

estimations for PPF5 and PCF5 can be made.
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Linkages (2 and 3, 6).
of the apertenances."
failure."

The system response is "structural failure

The outcomes are "partial failure" and "complete

The extent of failure of the apertenances would have a

large impact on the outcome.

Some of the factors would be:

1.

Number of structures that failed

2.

Whether or not structures are permanently

3.

Expected repair time, if repairs are possible

4.

Others

dama~ed

Since the greatest concern with respect to an apertenance failure is
the uncontrolled filling or expelling of reservoir water, possible
repair of the structures as well as repair time would be important
factors in the outcome.

The pool level at the time of failure would

also need to be considered.

Based on these as well as other pertinent

factors unique to a particular dam, estimations for PPF6 and PCF6 can
be made.
Linkages 0-3, 7).
ment."

The system response is "di fferential settle-

The outcomes consist of all appropriate outcomes.

The uncer-

tainties which can cause concern with respect to differential settlement in earth dams are:
1.

Degree of relative movement within the embankment resulting
from the settlement

2.

Amount of freeboard loss due to settlement

3.

Others

The concern which exists about relative movement is due to the potential
of significantly large cracks occurring in the embankment.

Many times

the configuration of the abutments and foundation will determine the

.~.
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type of cracking that will occur.

With regard to freeboard loss, it

is highly unlikely that a complete failure could occur due to a freeboard loss resulting from differential settlement.
not large enough.

The settlements are

Estimations for PNF3' PPF7' and PCF7 can then be

made based on careful consideration of the conditions presented above.
Estimation of Consequences
Exposure factors
Once the probabilities for each of the outcome conditions (PNF,
PPF, PCF) are known, the magnitude of the consequences can be estimated on the basis of various exposure factors
1.

Time of year

2.

Dam location

3.

Flood warning time

Time of year.

includin~'

This exposure factor affects two ma1n conditions:

1.

Pool level (i.e. volume of impounded water)

2.

Number of people in potential flood area

Potential impounded water usage predictions used in conjunction with
hydrological studies of the area would be valuable in predicting
net flow (whether it be outflow or inflow) as a function of the time
of year.

Relationships could then be developed for the volume of

impounded water as a function of the time of year.
Present and projected future land use of the area would allow
predictions of populations in potential flood zones downstream of the
dam.

Since the land use around or near a reservoir is very often of a

recreational nature populations vs. time of the year relationships
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would need to be developed from available local information.

Although

these predications would be unique to each dam considered, they could
be developed by using case histories of dams with similar characteristics (i.e. recreation, irrigation, and other needs which have shaped
the surrounding population growth).
Dam location.

This exposure factor affects land use downstream

which in turn affects the following:
1.

Number of people downstream

2.

Amount of property downstream (structures, agriculture, etc.)

3.

Aunt of aesthetically pleasing land downstream

The recreation potential and climate also can have a
the land use downstream.

lar~e

affect on

Present and predicted future quantities of

people, property and aesthetically valuable land in the potential
flood zones, would need to be done as a function of the life of the
earth dam structure.

Zoning maps as well as case histories of similarly

located dams would facilitate these predications.
Flood warning time.

This exposure factor is not considered in

estimating consequences resulting from a partial failure since no
flood is involved.

This exposure factor affects the following:

1.

Steps which can be taken to save people

2.

Steps which can be taken to save property

3.

Steps which can be taken to save natural aesthetics

Definitions of potential flood zones will be beneficial in describinjt
the affect of flood warning time.

Similar to a recommended procedure

of the Water Resources Council (1980) the flood zones are the following:
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1.

Primary flood zone, the area which is in the direct path of
the flood water currents

2.

Secondary flood zone, the area which is subject to rising
flood waters, but is not in its direct path

Based on either actual trial runs or case histories of evacuations
which have occurred in the past, estimates could be made on how many
people could be evacuated per unit of time.

Flood warning time would

probably have little effect on damages occurring in the primary flood
zone.

However, with sufficient warning, steps could be taken to save

a good portion of the property and natural aesthetics damage in the
secondary flood zone.
Procedures for estimating consequences
Using the exposure factors listed above, estimates of consequences
can be made.

The procedures for these consequences are explained below.

Repairable structural damage to dam.

This would depend almost

totally on the type of system response or combination of _responses
that caused the partial failure.

Estimates of dollar damages would be

made by using average repair costs per unit time multiplied by the
estimated time of repair.

The estimated time of repair would be a

direct result of the type and extent of damage incurred on the earth
dam structure.

As presented in Chapter III, the repair cost estimate

in dollars is multiplied by the probability of partial failure to equal
the expected costs of the structural damage due to a partial failure.
Loss of revenue.
existence of the dam.
factors:

R,~venue

refers to the regular income from the

Revenue is obtained based on the following
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1.

Power generation

2.

Irrigation (water rights, taxation, etc.)

3.

Flood control

4.

Recreation

5.

Navigation

6.

Others

Not all of these factors apply to every dam.

Based on these factors,

a study would be required to estimate the revenue in dollars per vear
which would be lost if the dam was no longer operable.

Since loss of

revenue can result from either a partial or complete failure outcome,
estimations of revenue loss would be done separately as explained in
Chapter III.
Irreparable structural damage to dam.
estimated in terms of dollars.

This type of damage can be

It is the estimated cost of the earth

dam project.
Loss of lives, property and natural aesthetics.

To estimate

losses of lives, property and natural aesthetics, a method such as the
one proposed by the Water Resources Council (1980) could be used.
There are basically four main steps in this method:
1.

2.

Delineate the affected zones
a.

primary flood zone

b.

secondary flood zone

Determine characteristics of affected zones (descriptions
of the existing and projected characteristics of the potential
flood zones)

3.

Projections of activities and land use of potential flood
zones
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4.

Collection of land market values of potential flood zones and
related data

Using flood routing techniques, the primary and secondary flood zones
could be delineated on maps of the area of the damsite.

The data

obtained from the four steps listed above is then used to estimate the
property damage in dollars, the lives lost and the loss of natural
aesthetics in terms of acres inundated.
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CHAPTER V
r

POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE

,

RISK ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
,. . 1

Discussion
It should be emphasized at this point that the risk analysis
should not be used as the "final word" for risk assessment of the dam
at this time.

It is, however, a very valuable source of information

for the engineer in making engineering decisions pertaining to earth
dam planning, design, construction, and operation.
Decisions involving cost and
safety trade-offs
Many decisions must be made during the planning, design, construction, and operation of earth dams.

Many of these decisions involve

trade-offs between increasing costs and increasing safety.

An example

which involves an economic criterion for defining an acceptable level
of risk consists of three curves as shown in Figure 12.
presents the plot of cost vs. dam embankment base width.

Curve a) reCurve b) re-

presents the relationship between expected cost due to damages resulting
from dam failure vs. dam embankment base width.

Curve c) represents

the summation of curves a) and b) and reveals the embankment base
width at which the combined costs are at a minimum <indicated by
point x in the figure).

However, current design practices might

require a minimum embankment base width of the value, point y.

Tn

this case the dam would have to be built according to accepted practice
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at an increased cost of ilz ($).

This emphasizes the point that

although the minimum cost can be found for various economic considerations of the dam

project~

that minimum cost may not be at an accept-

able level of risk.
Decisions based on risk analysis results
The expected values of the consequences of an earth dam failure
obtained from the risk analysis procedure can be very valuable in
terms of making these decisions which include the following items:
1.

Site selection

2.

Selection of design parameters

3.

Materials selection

4.

Embankment cross-sectional geometry and apertenant structural design

5.

Quality control

6.

Operating rules

There are potentially many other items in which risk analysis cou1d
lead to a more rational basis for decision making under uncertainty,
However~

the discussion below will be limited to the use of risk

analysis procedures in decision making with respect to the items
listed above.
Site selection.

Many factors are taken into account with respect

to the selection of a particular damsite.

Obviously, the amount of

material which is going to be required to construct an earth dam is
going to depend largely on the width of the structure.
other things to consider, however.

There are many

The geologic characteristics

,

of the foundation and/or abutments could jeopardize the site in terms
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of the potential safety of the dam.

A risk analysis procedure could

prove very valuable in making decisions which would provide a balance
between economy and safety of a particular damsite.

After several

potential sites have been considered and the list had been narrowed
down to two or three, the risk analysis could be performed on the
potential sites.

Although the data base at this point would be very

small, an assessment of the risk could be made for the damsites based
-

....,

on case histories of failures of similar dams.

Outcome and final

consequence estimations could then be used, in con;unction with other
pertinent factors, to make a final decision as to which damsite would
be the best in terms of safety, economy, and all other applicable
cons iderations.
Selection of design parameters.

If the risk analysis pro-

cedure revealed, for example, that the potential rise in pool level
was the major contributor in the potential failure and ultimate
consequences associated with a particular dam, this information could
lead to a decision to enlarge the emergency spillway.

Other decisions

may be with regard to slope stability considerations in which decisions
may be made, for example, to flatten the embankment slopes.

In any

case, the risk analysis can facilitate decision making during any part
of the design stage.
Materials selection.

The variability of the soil properties

of the embankment materials is an important factor in determining the
expected value of the consequences of dam failure.

It is analyzed by

means of the probabilistic slope stability analysis to determine the
probability of a slope stability failure in the risk analysis procedure.
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In general, the more variable the soil strength properties are, the
higher the probability of failure becomes,

When attempting to select

a borrow area, for example, some areas may contain soils with more
variable soil properties than others.

Hence, even though one borrow

area may be closer to the site and therefore cheaper to

haul~

it may

not be the best choice if it is highly variable with regard to its soil
strength properties.

If variability in the material is excessive, a

decision may have to be made to import material from more distant
borrow areas which could lead to rejection of the site if hauling
costs for borrow areas with lower variability soils are too high.
Quality control.

As discussed in the materials selection

topic, soil variability plays an important part in the embankment
safety.

Quality control is a means of reducing the variability of

every aspect of a dam project as well as the soil strength properties.
The risk analysis procedure provides a means for establishing the
level of quality control to be used by trading off the increases in
construction costs associated with higher levels of quality control
against the reduction in the expected consequences of dam failure.

If

it is determined that the high degree of quality control significantly
enhances the safety of the earth dam, a decision could be made to
increase the quality control and use a more economical materials
source.
Operating rules.

Since one of the major factors associated

with the operation of the dam is the control of the impounded water,
an important consideration is the influence of the operating rules on
the safety of the dam.

This consideration could be handled by
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performing a risk analysis on a few extreme cases and comparing the
results.

If effects are not too great, for example, operating rules

may not need to be very rigid.

Other aspects regarding the dam

operation may also be tried and decisions made accordingly.
Case Study of Growing Data Base
In cooperation with the Water and Power Resources Service, the
Soldier Creek Dam of Utah was selected for a case study of the proposed
risk analysis procedure.

Due to the. limited research development funds

available at this time, it was not possible to perform analytical work
on Soldier Creek Dam.

The feasibility study of this earth dam, which

is part of the Central Utah Project, was commenced in 194R and was
completed in approximately 1974.

A study performed by W. A. Wahler

and Associates was presented in June 1977 and recommended that the
reservoir filling process be delayed.

Data and information on the

Soldier Creek Dam was supplied by the Engineering and Research Center
office, Denver, Colorado.

A chronological list of the documents

supplied is shown in Table 3.

The material has been compiled in Table

2 to illustrate the "growing data and information baset! for Soldier
Creek Dam.

As shown in this table, the various reports, tests, and

analyses are categorized by activity types and located on a time
scale.

A detailed project activity sequence summary has been compiled

(see Table 4 in the appendix) and contains a brief description of
activities in their time sequence.
With the available data on Soldier Creek Dam and with extra data
available from WPRS, it will be possible to test the risk analysis

Soldier Creek Dam growing data base.

Table 2.
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Activity

55

57

58

59

60

62

61

61.

63

65

67

6~

69

n~

70

71

73

71.

75

76

77

78

79

80

Bank ReserStorage- voir Flood In, pec-

Inflow
Flood
Study

Hydrology

Geology

56

Cap- Sumf,
Seepage ab1litymary

Reconnaissance

tion

Construction
Engineering
Geology
Report

Report

Earth

Seismic
Monitoring

Seismicity

Quake

Evaluation

EmbankSlope
Stability

ment and
Foundation

Stability

Calculations

Inspection

Soil
Properties

Report

Lab
Tests

Construc-

Explora-

tion
Materials
Test Data

Lion

R.port

Foundat ion

Earth
Work
Tests

Explora-

Grout-

tion

ing

Abutment

Drilling

Spillway 6.

Hydraulics

Seepage
Inspection of
Abutments

Out let

Sumroary
Project
Activity

I>

Sequence*
*See project activity description to decode

nllmber~

8

9

10

II

12

13

14

15

(Table 4 in the appendix)

.....
N
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procedure.

Since the Soldier Creek Dam is complete, the next phase of

the case study will explore the differences in risk analysis results
obtained at different stages in the project's life.
indicate which of the proposed methods for

estimatin~

It would also
transition

probabilities can be used and which need to be modified.

An indication

of what kinds of data are more useful than others in performing the
risk analysis procedure will also be obtained.

This indication will

be valuable in recommendations for the types of data which should be
obtained from sampling and testing.
Advantages and Limitations of
the Risk Analysis Procedure
Advantages
1.

A design with a higher factor of safety does not necessarily
lead to a safer structure

2.

The designer is required to explicitly consider all of the
failure mechanisms

3.

Quantitative estimates of the transition probabilities are
required and this enables the designer to identify the most
likely modes of failure

4.

The procedure is adaptable to the "growing data base" of a
dam

Limitations
1.

Uncertainties associated with the probabilities which are
estimated using judgment and empirical data

2.

Considerable weight in the analysis is placed on transition
probabilities estimated by judgment
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3.

The framework may not be complete because some events and/or
linkages may have been overlooked

4.

All the information needed to perform the analysis may not be
readily available

5.

A considerable amount of time and effort would be required
to perform the enti.re analysis
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
_Conc 1us ions
A framework for risk analysis of an earth dam has been presented
with suggested procedures for estimating transition probabilities.
The general framework is also applicable to other types of civil
engineering structures.
1.

Before the probabilistic models, empirical and judgment procedures can be applied in practice, the risk analysis procedure
needs to be further developed.

In addition, procedures for

utilizing the knowledge of engineers to make the suh;ective
probability estimates need to be developed.
2.

The value of the continuation of future development of a practical
comprehensive risk analysis procedure for earth dams cannot be
over emphasized based on the advantages listed in Chapter V.

3.

The confidence which can be placed in the results of the risk
analysis procedure may be reduced due to certain limitations of
the procedure such as those listed in Chapter V.

4.

A possible means for handling the subjective probability estimates
is to lump these transition probabilities together and use historical values to estimate the lumped probabilities.

Baecher, et a1.

(1980) proposed a similar procedure in which they presented the
possibility that the observed rate of failure of 10 -4 represents
the frequency of unexpected causes.
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Recommendations

1

1.

To provide a practical test of the proposed risk analysis procedure
and to give opportunity for refining the techniques for

estimatin~

the transition probabilities, a detailed case study of Soldier
Creek Dam should be performed.

Phases of the project in which data

were either not available or insufficient to make adeQuate;udjm1ent
estimations, could be estimated by using lumped

probabilities as

described above.
2.

Future studies should be performed to develop empirical and probabilistic methods for those phases of the risk analysis procedure
which now depend on judgment decisions.

Some examples of the most

promising areas for study are:
a.

Probabilistic methods involving differential settlement

b.

Methods for evaluating core cracking and piping in dam
embankments

c.
3.

Human behavioral studies dealing with human error.

During future research studies, those elements of the risk analysis
procedure which are determined to be significant with regard to
their potential contribution to the probability of failure and
ultimate consequences, should be omitted from the procedure.

A

possib Ie criterion for deciding whether or not elements can be
ignored by comparing their probability of occurrence with the
probability of occurrence of natural phenomena.
4.

After further research and development work has been successfully
completed, the risk analysis procedure should be made accessible
to the practicing engineer by incorporating the entire procedure
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into an user-oriented interactive computer program.

The program

would require the user to select the method for estimating the
transition probabilities and these estimates would be made in
subroutines to the main program using user-supplied input.
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Table 3.

Soldier Creek Dam - chronological listing of information
collected from WRPS in December 1979.

DATE

TITLE

Feb.

1948

Reconnaissance Geological Report

June

3, 1958

Inflow Design Flood Study

June

3, 1958

Memo:

Design Storms for Soldier Creek Dam

Aug. 14, 1958

Memo:

Review of Inflow Design Flood

Sep. 11, 1958

Memo:

Inflow Design Flood Study for Soldier Creek nam

Sep.

1961

Lab Report: Earth Mtls. Investigation Lab Test "Results

Aug.

1964

Definite plan Report

Dec.

2, 1964

Lab. Tests on Proposed Embankment Mtls. for Final
Design

Jan.

1965

Geology Report No. G-210

Jan.

1965

Preconstruction Earth Mtls. Exploration Report GM-81

July

1965

Information Requested for Preparation of Specification
Designs and Estimates, D & E No. 171

1967

1968

Embankment Stability Calculations (Fel1inius - May
Solut ions)

Apr. 15, 1968

Memo: Discussion of Machine Control Parameters for
Stability Analysis by F. M. Method Using CDC-6400

May

2, 1968 Memo: Foundation Exploration
--

Mar. 25, 1969
1969
June

3, 1970

Spillway and Outlet Works, Design Summary
Specifications/Computations
Construction Materials Test Data Spec. No. nC-6854

- - - - - - - - - - -•.

~----
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Table 3.

Continued.

DATE
July

TITLE
1970

Dec. 22, 1972

Mar.

-

Design Consideration
Memo: Seismic Monitoring of Soldier Creek Reservoir

1972

Earthwork Field & Lab Testing with Summaries

1973

Record of Foundation and Tunnel Grouting

Aug. 12, 1974

Memo: Riprap Report

Aug.

1974

Construction Engineering Geology Report

Approx.

1974

Final Construction Report

Rpt. # G-295

,

June 10, 1975

Project Accretion Flow Studies (Feature: Rank

Stora~e

Seepage)
June 29, 1976

Reservoir Water-Holding Capability

Apr.

4, 1977

Flood Hydrology Summary

May

10, 1977

June

1, 1977

June

1977

July

6, 1977

Memo: Riprap Repair

Dec.

3, 1977

Faxogram: Subject: Technical Paragraph for Abutment

Memo: Inspection of Earth Embankment and Foundation
Memo: Earthquake Evaluation
Wahler Report

Drilling
May

4, 1978

Inspection Report

May

10, 1978

Inspection Report

Dec.

7, 1978

Memo: Water Samples

1978

Placement of Riprap

July 18, 1919

Memo: Water Samples

NO DATE

Standing Operating Procedures

&
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Table 4.

Soldier Creek Dam - project activity sequence description.

1.

Reconnaissance Geology Report (1948)
Preliminary Report:
No exploration has been done for construction at this point.
Material that seemed to be available by inspection was looked at.
Conclusions:
Foundation materials seemed to be adequate.
Further investigation will be needed for materials.

2.

Inflow Design Flood Study (1958)
Relatively detailed study was conducted with virtually all
contributing factors being taken into account. (i.e. aqueduct,
frequency study, diversion requirements).
Conclusions:
Agree with a preliminary design flood study which was
conducted July 16, 1948.
Two alternative inflow design floods were presented:
a) Maximum probable snowmelt and mod~rate frequency
rain.
b) Record snowmelt and maximum probable rain.

3.

Earth Materials Laboratory Report (1961)
This report still seemed reconnaissance oriented. Location and
description of borrow areas A-E was given. Descriptions and
results of borrow material tests were supplied.
Summary and Conclusions:
Required material volume estimates were given.
Availability estimates such as the type of materials
pervious or impervious) for each borrow area were given.
There were also some groundwater descriptions given.

4.

Laboratory Tests on Materials Proposed for "Final Design" Oc)64)
This involved a relatively detailed testing program
(gradation, Atterberg limits, compaction, placement,
consolidation, shear values, etc.).
Pre-construction test results were also shown.

5.

Summary of All Earth Materials Investigation Between 1C)48-65
Concluded that 3 million cubic yards of earth material would
be required.
Eleven borrow areas were investigated in detail:
Investigation outlined "sufficient" materials for the
construction of the dam.
Location and availability of the following was evaluated:
Concrete aggregates, riprap, lumber and mine timbers,
gravel road materials.
Geology Report No. G-210 (1965)
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Table 4.

Continued.

5.
Relatively detailed report which investigated:
(cont.)
Regional geology, damsitegeo10gy, construction materials.
Site conditions and earth materials investigations were
conducted using many borings.
Summary and Conclusions:
Soldier Creek Damsite is one of the best sites, if not the
best, left for water storage in Utah.
This conclusion is based on the geology, nearby availability of construction materials and overall design
requirements as a result of the site conditions.

6.

Stability Calculations: (1967-68)
Calculations were performed using the Fe11enius-~ay s01ution on
the following maximum section:
5 zones (middle zone was core with toe drain)
2 foundation layers.

7.

Stability Calculations were still being made
Memo from Chief Engineer concerning foundation exploration: (lQ6~)
Location and depth of 8 drill holes were reouested to
facilitate additional exploration for foundation.
Locations of 2 exploration lines (A and B) were reQuested for
profiles and geologic descriptions.

8.

Design Summary of Spillway and Outlet Works (1969)
Recommendations as a result of this study were:
a) Adopt single stage construction
b) Adopt two level outlet works without spillway
<initially approved December 12, 1967)
c) Adopt flip bucket with a limited stilling capacity.
d) Remove alluvial fan in mouth of side drainage draw to
expose sound rock but do not provide excavated channel
for side drainage. This assumes adoption of recommendation c).
e) Gate aeration is recommended only if design can be model
tested to establish satifactory performance. (Branch
Chief rejected proposed test at $10,000)
Addendum (April 1970)
Provisions for selective level withdrawals for protection of
game fish. (Estimated cost increase $200,000).
Selective level provisions with modified vertical shaft intake
was recommended.

9.

Construction Materials Test Data (1970)
No specific summaries were given.
Test results were given on:
Concrete aggregate, riprap, soil test data (nenver Lab ..
Field Lab., Borrow Areas A-G).
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Table 4.

Continued.

10.

Earthwork Field and Lab. Testing with Summaries (1972)
Construction has begun
Embankment testing and monitoring of in-place soil properties
is included with references to the locations of each sample
on the embankment with reference to its borrow origin.
Memo Dealing with Seismic Monitoring of Soldier Creek Reservoir
1972)
This memo was an attempt to negotiate a program to monitor the
earthquake potent ial with respect to the fillin~ of Soldier
Creek Reservoir. It still seemed to be pending due to funding
complications although the Bureau seemed to be much in favor.

11.

Record of Foundation and Tunnel Grouting (1973)
Location and extent of grouting was indicated.
Quantity, quality, and pressure of applied grout was also given
here.

12.

Construction Engineering Geology Report (1974)
The following information was given with respect to the
construction of Solider Creek Dam as related to:
Damsite, grouting, outlet works, access shaft, and
stilling basin, construction embankment materials.

13.

Bank Storage and Seepage
Reservoir Water - Holding Capability (1976)

14.

Flood Hydrology Summary (1977)
Summaries were included in the areas of:
Flood types, design storm, unit hydrographs, moderate
snowflood, maximum snowflood, combined design floods,
diversion frequency study, and historical floods.
Memo regarding earthquake evaluation was submitted: (1977)
Relatively detailed report for the purpose of evaluating
operating basic earthquake, design basic earthquake, maximum
credible earthquake, and the recurrence interval for two
seismotectonic provinces they called Basin and Range and Rocky
Mountain - Colorado Plateau.
Memo Regarding Inspection of Earth Embankment and Foundation

0977>.
Tables were compiled showing the following information for a
given day:
Elevation reservoir, time and amount (gpm) for the right
and left abutments, seepage respectively.
Memo regarding the drilling of observation holes in the abutments.
Information as to the requested well depth, location. and
nearest drill hole number were given.
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15.

Continued.

Seepage Inspect ion of Abutments (1978)
Regular readings have been taken at certain intervals and it
seems they will continue to be taken in future.
Water Samples (1978)
Information of water samples taken also at a regular basis.
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